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CONSORTIUM-RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR THE LOSS OF, IN CASES GROW-
ING OUT OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF A THIRD PERSON.
Two extremely interesting decisions have recently been ren-
dered by the Supreme judicial Court of Massachusetts. These
are Feneff v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 203 Mass. 278, which
holds that where a husband, injured by the defendant's negligence,
had received full compensation for his injuries, damages suffered
by the wife from loss of consortium as a direct result of the in-
jury were too remote to entitle the wife to maintain a separate
action for their recovery; and Bolger v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co.,
204 Mass. ; 91 N. E. 89, which holds that, in a similar situation,
a husband has also no right to recover for the loss of his wife's
consortium.
The right to recover damages for a loss of "consortiun" was
given by the common law in three instances, viz.: (I) Where the
defendant has enticed the wife away (abduction) ; (2) where the
defendant had alienated her affections, or had had criminal con-
versation with her (adultery) ; and (3) where the wife had been
injured by the negligence of the defendant (beating), 3 Black-
stone, i39, i4o. This right of consortium is a right growing out
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of the marital relation, which the husband and wife have, respec-
tively, to enjoy the society and companionship and affection of
each other in their life together. It "implies an exclusive right
against an invader to the wife's affection, companionship and aid."
Bigelow on Torts, 171; Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584. And
the essence of this right is its exclusiveness. At common law
the husband and the wife were treated as one person and marriage
operated as a suspension, in most respects, of the legal existence
of the latter. From this supposed unity of the two sprang all the
disabilities of a married woman. She could not maintain an ac-
tion at common law for the loss of consortium of her husband.
The reason of this was that she could not sue in her own name
for a personal injury, and that a recovery for such a wrong could
be had only in a suit brought jointly by her and her husband.
The right to the consortium of the other spouse seems to belong
to husband and wife alike, and to rest upon the same reasons
in favor of each. And since the very general removal of the
wife's disability to sue, the wife has never been denied an action
for a direct and intentional invasion through alienation of affec-
tions or other intentional conduct having a direct tendency to de-
prive her of the consortium of her husband. Nolin v. Pearson,
191 Mass. 283; Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584.
The original action for loss of consortium seems to have had
its foundation in that sort of injury. Bigaoette v. Paulet, 134
Mass. 123. See also Cooley, Torts, 38; Schoulcr, Dom. Rel.
Sect. 77. The extension of the action to cases of negligent con-
duct was then made, so that it came generally to be held that
if by any injury wrongfully or negligently inflicted upon the
wife, the husband was deprived of her society and services, lie
had a right of action therefor per quod consortium amisit, in addi-
tion to his action for expenses for medicine and nursing. Fuller
v. Naugatuck R., 21 Conn. 556; Hopkins v. Atlantic & St. L. R.,
36 N. H. 9; Matteson v. N. Y. Central R., 35 N. Y. 487. And
later cases have not changed this rule. See Birmhgham So. Ry.
v. Linter, 141 Ala. 420, where it was held that a husband may
recover fo. loss of consortium, for the loss of the "amenities and
conjugal incidefits of the relation of husband and wife." So also
Lyons z. N. Y. City Ry., 97 N. Y. Supp. 1033; Booth v. Man-
chester St. Ry., 73 N. H. 529; Chic. & Al. Electric Ry. v.
Krempel, 116 I1l. App. 253; Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. Cosby, lO7
Ind. 32; Cullar v. Al., K. & T. Ry., 84 Mo. App. 347. In Massa-
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chusetts, as late as the case of Kelley v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R.,
i68 Mass. 3o8, it was held that a husband might maintain an ac-
tion against a railroad corporation for consequential damages,
including the loss of consortium with his wife, arising from
personal injuries occasioned by its negligence, although an action
had been brought by her against the corporation for such injuries.
But in the recent case of Feneff v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R.,
supra, this rule has been changed. Overruling to this extent the
Kelley decision, the court said: "We are of opinion that' in this
class of cases there should be no recovery for loss of consortium,
when the impairment of the powers and faculties of the plain-
tiff's spouse has been fully paid for in money. Indirectly the
plaintiff in such a case reasonably may be expected, through the
same marital relation which gives a right of consortium, to be
somewhat benefited by such a payment."
The court distinguishes between cases where there has been
a direct and intentional invasion of one's right of consortiunm.as
in cases of alienation of affection and criminal conversation, and
cases where there has been an injury to the person of the other
spouse, for which that other has recovered, or is entitled to re-
cover, full compensation in his own name. In the latter situa-
tion the only effect upon the plaintiff's right of consortium is
that, through the physical or mental. disability of the other, the
companionship is less satisfactory and valuable than before the
injury. Ordinarily this damage is only remote and consequential.
"It is enough for the present case that persons whose relations to
the injured party are purely domestic should not be permitted to
share the compensation to which he is entitled for the impairment
of his powers by the tort of another person, nor to receive an ad-
ditional sum beyond the full compensation to which the injured
person is entitled. Their d mages are too remote to be made the
subject of an action."
As no valid distinction could be made between the husband's
right to recover for the loss of the wife's consortium, in cases
growing out of the negligence of a third party, and the wife's
right to recover for loss of the husband's consortium in like cases,
it was held that the later case of Bolger v. Boston Elevated




RIGHT OF STATES TO DECLARE NON-NAVIGABLE RIVERS NAVIGABLE.
The Desplaines River in Illinois, although unnavigable, was
declared navigable by the State Legislature. In the recent case
of People v. Economy Light and Power Co., reported in the 89
N. E. Rep. 76o, a bill in equity to restrain the defendant from
erecting a dam across the river and to cause the removal of that
part of the dam already erected, was dismissed. The decision
was based upon the ground that to grant the" injunction would be
to deprive the defendant of vested property rights which existed
in him with reference to the river in its original state.
The court first found that the title to the bed of the stream was
in the defendant, who was a riparian proprietor. Under a well-
established rule of law such a proprietor, in the absence of
language limiting his ownership to the edge of the stream, owns
to the thread thereof. Braxton v. Bressler, 64 Ill. 488; Angell,
Water Courses, Sect. 5; Coovert v. O'Conner, 8 Watts (Pa.) 47o;
Shell v. Mattison, 81 Minn. 38.
The uninterrupted use of one's property is a right guaranteed
to every citizen of the United States by its Constitution, and a
similar provision may also be found in practically all of the State
constitutions. A man's property is his absolutely to use as he
sees fit, so long as he does not violate the rights of another.
There are times when the right of an individual must be sub-
servient to the public good; and for this purpose the power of
eminent domain may be invoked. "* * * Yet the right of eminent
domain does not authorize the government, even for a full com-
pensation, to take the property of one citizen and transfer it to
another, when the public is not interested in the transfer." An-
gell, Water Courses, Sect. 467 (7th Ed.).
If the riparian proprietors, then, own to the thread of the
stream, is not a legislative enactment declaring a non-navigable
stream navigable, without making provision for the compensation
of the owners who are to be thus deprived of their vested rights,
unconstitutional ?
The good to be derived by the public in the matter of declaring
certain streams navigable is sometimes greater than the rights
of the individual. In Morgan v. King, 35 N. Y. 454, which
seems to be the most cited case on this subject, the court said:
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"If prior to the passage of the act, the stream was private, in
use as in property, the legislature could not take away the rights
of those who were then riparian owners, nor subject such rights
to a public use, created or authorized by the act itself, without
compensation. A statute declaring a private stream, on which
riparian owners have vested interests, a public highway, without
providing compensation to the owners is null and void." Glover
v. Powell, IO N. J. E. 211; Murray v. Preston, io6 Ky. 561;
Thunder Bay River Booming Co. v. Speechly, 31 Mich. 336;
Farnurn, Waters and Water Rights, Vol. I, p. 119; State v. Pool,
74 N. C. 402; People v. Elk River, (etc.) Co., 107 Cal. 221;
Spring v. Russell, 7 Greenl. (Me.) 273.
All navigable streams are for the public use and are considered
public highways. There can, of course, be no exclusive appro-
priation of them by an individual to his private use. Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, p. 590; Thunder Bay (etc.) Co. v.
Speechly, supra. While a State Legislature may determine wheth-
er or not a stream is navigable, the navigability of a stream is to
be determined with reference to its natural condition, and when
it is not navigable in fact the declaration of the legislature that
it shall be deemed a navigable stream will not make it so. The
Daniel Ball, io Wall. 557; U. S. v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation
Co., 174 U. S. 690; The Montello, 20 Wall. 430; Morgan v.
King, supra.
The test of navigability is one which causes confusion. Sir
Mathew Hale, in his work on De lure Mars (Hargrave's Law
Tracts, pp. 8 and 9), says: "There be some streams or rivers
that are private, not only in propriety and ownership, but also in
use, as little streams or rivers that are not a common passage for
the King's people." And in Rowe v. Granite Bridge Co., 21
Pick. (Mass.) 344: It is not "every small creek in which a fishing
skiff or gunning canoe can be made to float at high water that is
deemed navigable; but, in order to give it the character of a
navigable stream it must be generally and commonly useful to
some purpose of trade or agriculture." The real test seems to be
that streams must be capable, in their natural condition, of being
used as commercial highways over which ordinary river trade or
travel may be conducted. The Daniel Ball, supra; Cooley's
Consti. Lim. 590; Harrison v. Hite, 148 Fed. 481; Olive v. State,
86 Ala. 88.
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Nor will the artificial improvement of a river making it navig-
able enable the legislature to divest riparian owners of their
rights. Canal Coirs. v. People, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 423; Webster
v. Harris, I I Tenn. 668; Cooley's Consti. Linm., p. 590.
It is almost universally held that if a person improves a stream,
at his own expense, so as to make it navigable, he may at any time
render it again unnavigable. De Jure Marls, supra, p. 9. And
the owner may open a way for his own accommodation and re-
fuse to permit others to use it without just compensation. Wads-
worth Adir. v. Smith, ii Me. 278. In Crenshaw v. Slate River
Co., 6 Rand. (Va.) 254, the court held that after a mill was
established and a dam erected and the use of the water granted
to the miller, the legislature could not subsequently compel him
to build locks through his dam without a full indemnification for
the injury done to his vested rights. State v. Glen, 53 N. C. 321
Glov'cr v. Powell, IO N. J. 1. 211.
In view of the constitutional provision against the taking of
private property for public use except by the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, it is clear that a state can no more
make an unnavigable river a public highway tian it can build a
public road over one's farm without paying for the right of way.
The rule undoubtedly is that a state can not in any way make
an unnavigable stream navigable and thereby destroy or damage
the private property rights of adjacent owners without making
compensation. If the public good is to be subserved by forcing
a public way through private possessions, the only condition on
which it can be permitted in constitutional governments is that
the owner he compensate.1 for the property which he surrenders
to the public. C. V. P., Jr.
VALIDITY OF A CONTRACT BETWEEN ALL TIE STOCKHOLDERS OF A
CORPORATION FOR TIE CONTROL OF TIE BOARD OF DIRECTORS.
A very important and interesting decision in corporation law
has just been handed down by the New Jersey Court of Appeals
and Errors. The question involved is a novel one: Is a contract
valid which is entered into by two persons, who own all of the
capital stock of the corporation, providing for the control of the
board of directors of the corporation? This court thinks it is
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not. Jackson v. Hooper and others, New York Law Journal,
Vol. XLII, No. 129, March 8, i9io, reversing the decree of the
Vice-Chancellor in the same case, 74 Atl. i3o.
The facts in this case are very complicated, but so far as nec-
essary for our purpose may be stated as follows: The parties
to this suit, Jackson and Hooper, composed a partnership en-
gaged in the sale of books on subscription. For reasons not here
material, they formed two corporations, one in England and one
in Illinois, turned over the partnership business to these corpora-
tions, and elected three of their employes as nominal directors,
with the express understanding and agreement that they were
not to have any actual control of the business, but were to act
only on the concurring instructions of Jackson and Hooper. A
disagreement as to the policy and conduct of the business having
arisen, Hooper managed to control the nominal directors, and
thus practically excluded the complainant from all participation
and control in the business.
This bill is filed on the theory that, as between the parties,
Jackson and Hooper were really partners, employing the cor-
porations as mere agencies for carrying on their business, and
prays for an accounting of the partnership affairs, an injunction
restraining the defendants from excluding the complainant from
his proper participation in the business, and for general relief.
The question as to the possibility of conducting a business
and using the corporate form merely as an agency has been pre-
sented to the courts only once, so far as we have been able to
discover. The English House of Lords denied that such a
state of facts could exist. Lord Halsbury, L. C., said: "It seems
to me impossible to dispute that once the company is legally in-
corporated it must be treated like any other independent person,
with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself, and that the
motives of those who took part in the promotion of the company
are absolutely irrelevant in discussing what those rights and lia-
bilities are." The company was either a legal entity or it was
not; if it was, then the business belonged to it; if it was not,
there was no person and no thing to be an agent. Salomon v.
Salomon Co., L. R. 1897, App. Cas. 22, p. 30.
The logic of this view seems unassailable; so we may grant
that the parties were stockholders and not partners, and look at
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the validity of the contract relative to the control of the board of
directors.
Contracts of this kind are usually so fraudulent on their face
that they are seldom presented for judicial inspection, but they
have been presented to the courts several times in the form of a
promise by a large stockholder or a director, to elect a man to an
office, and to keep him in such office, if he will purchase stock
in the corporation. In holding such a contract to be void, the Su-
preme Court of the United States said, "The principle is well
settled in regard to public employments. Ascanyan v. Arms Co.,
103 U. S. 261. The same doctrine has been applied to the
directors of a private corporation, charged with duties of a
fiduciary nature to private parties, on the view that it is public
policy to secure fidelity in the discharge of such duties. Wardell
v. R. R. Co., 103 U. S. 651. See also Woodruff v. Wentworth,
133 Mass. 309. We think this principle is equally applicable, on
the ground of public policy, although there was not to be any di-
rect private gain to the defendant; for'* * * it was the right
of the other stockholders * * * to have the defendant's judgment,
as an officer of the company, exercised with a sole regard to the
interests of the company." West v. Camden, 135 U. S. 507.
The same conclusion is reached in McCarter v. Fireman's
Ins. Co., 73 Atl. (N. J.) 8o, at 85. But in this case the corpora-
tion, an insurance company, owed a duty to the public.
These decisions, it will be observed, are based on the principle
that a fraud is being committed on somebody; either the public
at large, a particular part of the public, or the stockholders in the
corporation. In the principal case, all these elements are lacking;
the corporation was not of a public or a quasi-public nature, it
was solvent, and all the stockholders knew of and assented to
this agreement. On this subject, the Massachusetts Court has
said, by way of dictum, "Whether it (an agreement to elect a
man to office if he would purchase stock) was not void as against
public policy, even if all the stockholders consented to it, is a
question of great difficulty, and * * * would require careful
consideration." Woodruff v. Wentworth, supra.
There might very well be a doubt as to the invalidity of this
contract on the ground of public policy under this line of
argument. But it was certainly unenforceable on another ground.
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It took the control of the corporation away from those named by
law to manage it. This corporation was organized under the
laws of the State of Illinois, and their corporation act provides
(Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 32, Sect. 6), that "The corporate powers
shall be exercised by a board of directors or managers." This
provision is, of course, a part of the charter of every corporation
organized under this act.
The extent to which this provision has been applied is, perhaps,
best illustrated by the doctrine that a corporation can not become
a member of a partnership. This is because of the peculiar rela-
tions of partners, and their powers to bind their copartners.
"The whole policy of the law creating and regulating corpora-
tions looks to the exclusive management of the affairs of the
corporation by the officers provided for or authorized by its
charter." Mallory v. Oil Co., 86 Tenn. 598.
In asserting the same doctrine, the Massachusetts Court has
said: "If. the assent of all the stockholders were shown to the
formation of the partnership-which is not the fact-it could not
enlarge the powers of the corporation, or make that legal which
was inconsistent with the law limiting their powers and prescrib-
ing their duties." Whittenton Mills v. Upton, io Gray, 582. This,
as is apparent on its face, is merely dictum, but coming from a
court of this rank is worthy of consideration on the subject.
It has been held in a number of jurisdictions that the directors
are trustees for the corporation, or at least stand in a fiduciary re-
lation to it. 3 Thompson's Commentaries on the Law of Cor-
porations, Sect. 401o, and cases there cited.
Under this theory, the contract would be unenforceable, for it
is a settled rule of equity that trustees must all act, they can not
agree that a part of the body shall act for all; in other words, they
can not delegate their authority, even to a co-trustee. See
Bispham on Equity, Sect. 145.
It has been held in a number of cases that a trustee must exer-
cise absolute control over the subject matter of the trust. This
may be illustrated by a case somewhat analogous to the partner-
ship cases above. A trustee has no right to invest trust funds
in a "contributory" mortgage, as this takes away that absolute con-
trol. Webb v. Jonas, 39 Ch. Div. 66o.
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The Central Law Journal, Vol. 70, p. 255, in commenting on
this case, calls attention to the fact that Judge Dill, who ren-
dered the decision of the Court, was, before he went on the bench,
one of the best known and most able corporation lawyers in the
country, and remarks that he would naturally lean "in a direction
of showing the ready adaption of corporate organization to the
needs of commercial enterprise." This fact gives additional
weight to the correctness of the conclusions that he has reached
in this case. This conclusion works a hardship on the complain-
ant, but it appears from the authorities that he is without relief,
certainly by an action of this nature.
